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REGULATORY CHANGE: A STEP IN 
THE RIGHT DIRECTION 
STEPHEN J. FRIEDMAN 
Executive Vice President and General Counsel, 
The Equitable Financial Companies 
New York, New York 
Congress is currently validating change that has already occurred. 
However, there are very important questions of structure that remain. 
The most important question, I think, is the reality of firewalls. I believe 
in firewalls, but as both a lawyer and a regulator I have a healthy respect 
for their limitations. I have some concerns about their efficacy, born 
largely of my personal experience in coming to Baldwin United when the 
walls began to crumble and the company began to fail. In a confidence 
business, which is the business all financial institutions are in, it is very 
difficult to control the effect of adverse events anywhere in the system. 
Containment of damage is possible, but there is reason to proceed 
carefully and to assess the effects of our experience as we go along. We 
must gauge the effects of the condition of Texas banks on public 
confidence, and the effects of Continental Illinois. We have to learn from 
those lessons. 
The pace of change is extremely important. Congressman Barnard is 
surely right: we ought not be afraid of change. In fact, in this area it does 
not do any good to be afraid of change because change happens anyway. 
The markets change, institutions change, and financial institutions and 
instruments change. The real issue is never whether change is going to 
take place, but whether the regulators, the Congress, and public 
policymaking are in the driver's seat when change happens. Historically, 
'See, e.g. , Hayes, Even Strong Suffer in State Thrift Crisis, N.Y. Times, May 18, 
1987, at D l ,  col. 3; Klott, Nearly $1 Billion of U.S .  Aid Averts Texas Bank's Fall, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1987, at D l ,  col. 1 (on the worsening situation of the 
Texas thrift industry and the most notable recent bank failure in Texas). See also 
Inquiry Into Continental Illinois Carp. and Continental Illinois National Bank: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supemision, Regulation and Insurance of the 
House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 300 
(1984) (on the Continental Illinois failure generally). 
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they have not been in the driver's seat. In effect, legislative and regulatory 
action is the conservative course here. 
The interrelationship among financial markets is so complex that it is 
virtually impossible to predict the results of change. There are dramatic 
examples of acting that appeared to be very small changes. There is 
probably no better example than Rule 415.2 I was a Securities and 
Exchange Commission Commissioner when Rule 415 was adopted. I 
remember very clearly the staff saying that Rule 415 was a technical 
change designed to permit issuers access to markets even more quickly 
than the two or three days that the improved procedures then ~ e r m i t t e d . ~  
At that time, we were still in a period of extremely volatile interest rates. 
As it turned out, Rule 415 absolutely revolutionized the securities 
industry. It led to a degree of concentration in the underwriting of debt 
securities that no one had imagined. 
Money market funds are another example of dramatic change. The 
invention of money market funds revolutionized the banking business. It 
was the primary engine of disintermediation in the 1970s and, more 
importantly, it had a dramatic effect on the relationship of depositors to 
financial  institution^.^ I remember very clearly a banker saying to me, 
"Never in our wildest dreams did we imagine that people would take their 
life savings and put them in an envelope and send them off in the mail to 
someone they had never met." But that is the nature of banking today. 
While change is important, in addition to a measured pace of change, 
affirmative action and legislative action are also very important. The real 
challenges do not lie in the area of new banking powers. If you go back 
and look at the new powers, it is hard to imagine what all the excitement 
was about. The new powers include distributing mutual funds, 
underwriting revenue bonds, and underwriting corporate debt.5 There is 
virtually no risk in underwriting mutual funds. Have you ever heard of a 
security firm that failed-or almost failed-because it underwrote mutual 
217 C.F.R. $ 230.415 (1988) (allowing certain securities to be registered for 
an offering to be made on a continuous or delayed basis, provided the 
registration statement meets certain requirements). 
3E.g. ,  SEC's Spencer Analytes Rule 415, Doubts Many Innovations Under Shelf 
OfferingRule, Vol. 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 903 (May 21, 1982). 
4See T. Cook & J. Duffield, Monty Market Mutual Funds and Other Short-Term 
Investment Pools in Instruments of the Money Market, in INSTRUMENTS IN THE 
MONEY MARKET 159-64 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond 6th ed. 1986). 
5See S. 1886, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 108, 134 CONG. REC. S3520 (daily ed. 
Mar. 31, 1988). 
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funds? Second, banks already underwrite many kinds of revenue bonds. 
Third, what banks do everyday is parallel to underwriting corporate debt, 
but much riskier because they retain the debt on their books. Therefore, it 
is hard to imagine an  intellectually respectable argument that 
underwriting corporate debt is a dangerous activity for banks. The same 
is true of underwriting equities. I used to believe that banking had 
become a riskier business than the securities business, but the events of 
October 19, 1987 have given everyone pause.6 
With regard to the market crash, it is significant that there was no 
major failure by any securities firm in the face of a very dramatic loss in 
value and enormous strains on the system. At the same time, there is a lot 
that needs fixing. Anyone who went through that period can pinpoint 
areas of extreme danger in which, had things gone in a slightly different 
way, there would have been enormous stresses on the system. But those 
were stresses for the financial system as a whole, not for individual 
securities firms. 
In short, I believe that the real challenges to banking regulation are in 
the area of traditional banking activities. Over the past ten years, while all 
of the legislative effort and the debate has been focused on the Glass- 
Steagall Act and securities powers-and more recently on insurance 
powers-dramatic changes have been taking place in traditional 
banking.' These changes have significantly increased the risk in the 
banking system. For example, there has been a very curious and largely 
unexamined series of excesses in traditional lending over the last ten or 
fifteen years: excessive lending to the real estate industry in the early 
1970s, lending to less developed countries, petrodollar lending, and 
lending to the oil patch.8 
In a sense, the problems of the savings and loan industry are really 
another aspect of this problem of excess. Occasionally one sees newspaper 
articles that attribute the problems of savings and loans to the 
6The Crash of '87: Stocks Plunge 508 Amid Panicky Selling, Wall St. J . ,  Oct. 20, 
1987, at 1, col. 5. 
'See generally ADRIAN HAMILTON, THE FINANCIAL REVOLUTION (1986). 
8See Berg, Banks Study Strategy to Replenish Reserves, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 
1987, at D l ,  col. 1 ; Schmitt and Hill, Banks to Post Record $10 Billion Loss for 2nd 
Quarter: Industries Foreign-Debt Reserve Additions are Exceedi y Forecasts, Wall St. J . , 
July 20, 1987, at 2, col. 2; Berg, Mediocre Quarter For Banks, N.Y. Times, May 4, 
1987, at D5, col. 1; Nash, U . S .  Banks' Profit Drop Linked to Brazil Loans, N.Y. 
Times, May 22, 1987, at D5, col. 5. 
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deregulation of asset powers.g In my view that is a wrong-headed position 
to take. In the early 1980s, the savings and loan industry was in a crisis 
because of volatility of interest rates and inflation, rampant 
disintermediation, short-term liabilities, and long-term fixed-rate assets. 
They were simply unable to cope with the financial facts of their 
existence. The deregulation providing for more flexible asset powers was a 
response to that.1° How savings and loans used those powers, and how 
their use was regulated, are quite different questions. The whole area has 
been inadequately explored and is certainly inadequately understood. 
There has been an increasing disparity in the mix of assets of different 
kinds of banks, large and small, that is making the traditional ways of 
regulating those banks obsolete. There is probably no better example 
than the new capital rules." There is general agreement that the new 
capital rules are important. Indeed, they are one of the more impressive 
regulatory accomplishments of the past decade. But the notion of treating 
all assets of a given kind-all loans for example-in the same way is 
deeply flawed. It illustrates the limits of regulation. How is it possible for a 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, or the FDIC, to 
develop rules that apply to the rich diversity and complexity of our 
banking system? Those capital rules may be as good as they can be, but 
they are still not adequate for the range of risks and challenges that the 
banking system poses. Fundamental questions have been raised in the last 
few years about the role of deposit insurance in this environment; for 
example, the possibility of risk-based deposit insurance has been 
explored.12 These questions go deeply to the nature of the risks that are 
individual to particular banks. 
- - 
gSee, e.g., McCoy, Financial Fraud: Theories Behind Nationwide Surge in Bank 
Swindles, Wall St. J . ,  Oct. 2, 1987, at 23, col. 3. 
1°Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97- 
320, 96 Stat. 1496 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see 
also GAO Issues Report on Condition of S&L Industry from 1977 through June 1987, 50 
Banking Rep. (BNA) 858 (May 23, 1988). 
"See Virtually Identical Risk-Based Capital Proposals Issued for Comment by 
Agencies, 50 Banking Rep. (BNA) 382 (Mar. 7, 1988). Since the time of Mr. 
Friedman's speech the Basle Committee has also released its risk-based 
standards. See Basle Committee Issues Final Risk-Based Capital Standards, 51 Banking 
Rep. (BNA) 135 (July 25, 1988); Final International Risk-Based Capital Standards 
Adopted by the Basle Committee on Banking Regulation, 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) 143 
(July 25, 1988) (text of Basle Committee's final accord). 
12See, e.g., Structure and Regulation of Financial Firms and Holding Companies: 
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of  the House o f  Representatives Committee on Government 
Operations (Part 3), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 390-463 (1987) [hereinafter Structure and 
Regulation] (testimony by Thomas F. Huertas and Rachel Strauber, Analysis of 
Alternative Proposalsfor Deposit Insurance Rtjorm). 
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A few years ago, Tamar Frankel, a faculty member of the Boston 
University School of Law, and I developed an idea that would model 
capital rules on the approach chosen by the Congress in the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act.13 The Act imposed a heavy burden on the board of 
directors of a company to develop systems of internal controls that were 
appropriate for that company. This led to a mini-industry that grew in the 
accounting firms, which developed and tailored packages of internal 
controls that were appropriate for particular companies. This is a possible 
approach. There may be others, but some fundamental rethinking has to 
be done in this area. 
There is significant increased risk in the banking system. The public 
markets, particularly the commercial paper markets in the short-term, 
and the debt markets in the longer term, have taken away the highest 
credits from the banking system. l4 The maturities of loans have increased 
progressively.15 Thus, what we have are higher risk, longer term loans 
that have changed the kind of risk a bank takes. Banks have begun to 
respond to that through the development of securitization, which poses 
the risk as to investors. 
Certainly since the early 1970s there has been increased volatility in 
all our markets.16 Traditional bank trading activities, trading government 
bonds and currencies, represent a level of great magnitude of risk in 
trading. Some of you may have noticed that last year's Banker's Trust Fourth 
Quarter Report showed very high profits that were due to currency trading 
activities. l7 That is wholly different from the level of risk assumed by most 
securities firms in trading for the accounts of their customers.18 
Globalization is discussed a great deal. However, few people 
understand the extent of the impact of globalization. A former senior staff 
I3Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-2 13, tit. I, 91 Stat. 
1494-98 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U .S.C .). 
I4See Structure and Regulation, supra note 12, at 247-92 (testimony by Thomas 
F. Huertas and Rachel Strauber, Competitive Environment Facing Banks). 
I5See G. HEMPEL, A. COLEMAN & D. GIMONSON, BANK MANAGEMENT 
TEXT AND CASES 28-30 (2d ed. 1986). 
I6See, e .g . ,  S.P. Feinstein, Stock Market Volatilip, in ECON. REV. 42 (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta Nov./Dec. 1987); Capital Markets, ECON. TRENDS 17
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland Mar. 1987). 
"See Hill and Guether, Major Banks Found Post-Crash Turmoil To Yield Bonanza 
in Foreign Exchange, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1988, at 2 ,  col. 3. 
I8E.g. ,  Stevens, Big Bank Gain from Trading in Currencies, Wall St. J., May 4, 
1987, at 44, col. 1 ; Stevens, Currency Trades Again Aid Bank Results: Concerned 
Analysts Cite Earnings Volatility, Wall St. J . ,  July 27, 1987, at 25, col. 1. 
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officer at the Federal Reserve said at a meeting the other day that he 
believes there is no academic exposition anywhere that describes, in a 
reasonable and accurate way, global securities markets. During the two 
weeks after October 19, 1987, there was an  extraordinary linkage between 
international markets-between the markets in London, New York, and 
Tokyo.lg There is no particular reason why there should be such a 
linkage. Each of those equity markets is based in a different economy with 
different strengths and different economic forces, but the linkage was very 
direct. What is the significance of that? Why did it happen? What are its 
implications? The fact is that when the markets are broader than the 
reach of the regulator, regulation is fundamentally impossible and the 
potential for abuse is enormous. 
In addition, I would simply sound a note on the limits of regulation. I 
think it is significant that there is a linkage between the nature and extent 
of regulation and the degree of flexibility that you give to market 
participants. The willingness of the society and the Congress to tolerate 
abuse is a key variable. If we are unable to tolerate abuse and our 
objective is to avoid problems, we inevitably end up with a highly 
coercive, highly inflexible set of regulations. The two most successful 
examples of financial regulation, in the sense of avoiding problems, are 
the Investment Company Act and New York's Insurance Regulation in 
the twentieth century.20 They are also the two most inflexible, most 
difficult, regulatory regimes. They have also proved to be the most 
inappropriate for this environment. If regulation does not go in that 
direction-and I think it would be a dreadful mistake to do so-if we opt 
for flexibility, then some degree of abuse, and of failure, is inevitable. 
This places a new emphasis on enforcement. In the securities business, 
where flexibility has been very important and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has been loath to interfere with innovation, there has been 
very heavy reliance on enforcement as a means of controlling improper 
lgSee, e.g., Share Prices Plunge Across Asia, Europe as U.S. Decline Stuns Equities 
Markets, Wall St. J . ,  Oct. 20, 1987, at 50, col. 1 ; Stock Prices Fall Across Asia and 
Europe as Decline of Dollar Weighs on Markets, Wall St. J . ,  Oct. 29, 1987, at 48, col. 
1; Share Prices Drop on Most Exchanges on Anxiety About Dollar, U.S.  Policy, Wall St. 
J . ,  Nov. 10, 1987, at 54, col. 1. 
201nvestment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. I ,  54 Stat. 789, $$ 1-53 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. $5 80a-1 - 80a-52); see Nathan F. Jones, Comparison ofstate 
Insurance and Federal Securities Requirements, INSURANCE PRODUCTS UNDER THE 
SECURITIES LAWS 121 (Practising Law Institute 452 (1984)). 
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behav i~r .~ '  Although there are indications that this approach is beginning 
to be taken in banking regulation, further evolution toward more vigorous 
enforcement would be a very new development. 
Lastly, and related to the limits of regulation, it is important to 
recognize that regulating financial institutions is a very tough business. 
These are complex markets. Watch the activity on the floor of the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, which, I am told, has more math PhDs than 
Northwestern University. You will see, immediately, how far ahead of the 
regulators they are. That is true in every financial industry. It is just more 
palpable in Chicago. 
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